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THE LIMITS OF OBLIGATION. By James S. Fishkin. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 1982. Pp. viii, 184. $18.50. 
If one can save a human life at minor personal cost, one is morally 
required to do so. Few persons would disagree with such a modest proposi-
tion. Although the extent of an individual's positive moral obligation to aid 
others can be controversial, this watered-down principle of "minimal altru-
ism" receives nearly universal acceptance. Yet, as James Fishkin points out 
in The Limits of Obligation, this principle is one of many common ethical 
assumptions that break down when applied on a sufficiently large social 
scale. 
Fishkin introduces this thesis in a striking manner by analyzing the con-
sequences of "minimal altruism" for Peter Singer's famine relief scenario 
(pp. 3-7).1 This scenario supposes that a small gift of five or ten dollars to a 
famine relief charity will save the life of a starving refugee. The cost of 
such a donation to a typical donor in Western society would be negligible; 
the value of the human life saved is far greater. Thus, the principle of 
"minimal altruism" requires that one make the donation. Fishkin, how-
ever, argues that this principle also mandates many more small contribu-
tions, since each incremental contribution saves a human life at an 
imperceptibly small marginal cost to the contributor. Ultimately, "minimal 
altruism" requires the donor to continue giving until the marginal cost of an 
additional gift becomes burdensome, by which point he may have given 
away a substantial portion of his income. Thus, a moral obligation which 
seemed unassailable at a low level results in generosity that most of us 
would consider far beyond the call of duty. From this example, and many 
others Fishkin concludes: that "[t]he admission of any . . . principle of 
general obligation to perform actions on behalf of any other person or 
group will lead, at the large scale, to the breakdown of the basic structure of 
individual morality."2 Paradoxically, the author argues persuasively that to 
abandon such a notion of general obligation entirely seems "a denial of our 
common humanity" (p. 33). 
Fishkin's "basic structure of individual morality" consists of three moral 
assumptions. Fishkin calls the first the "robust zone of indifference": "A 
substantial proportion of any individual's actions falls appropriately within 
the zone of indifference or permissibly free personal choice" (p. 23). This 
principle simply recognizes that most of our daily actions have so little 
moral significance as to be morally neutral - e.g., choosing to wear a blue 
sweater rather than a brown one.3 The words of this principle are carefully 
chosen. The zone is "robust" because the vast bulk of our actions fall 
I. Singer, Famine, Aj/luence and Morality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 21-35 
(P. Laslett & J. Fishkin eds. 1979). 
2. P. 33 (emphasis in original). General obligations, as Fishkin uses the term are those 
which '~'!Y of us could owe to a'!Yone else, including a total stranger." P. 25 (emphasis in 
original). 
3. The author does not suggest that such acts have no moral significance, but that the 
moral implications fall below the "cutoff for triviality." P. 89. 
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within it. Fishkin finds this situation entirely appropriate, for if moral is-
sues were to invade the bulk of our mundane daily decisions, we would lose 
the freedom to control our daily lives that we correctly regard as our right. 
Second, Fishkin assumes the existence of a "cutoff for heroism": "Cer-
tain levels of sacrifice cannot be morally required of any given individual" 
(p. 14). For example, a soldier is not morally blameworthy ifhe refuses to 
sacrifice himself by smothering a grenade with his body, even though the 
act would save his comrades. No one can define the precise level at which 
sacrifice becomes heroic. This imprecision makes the assumption relatively 
uncontroversial. As Fishkin notes, this assumption is commonplace in re-
cent moral theory.4 
Fishkin's final moral assumption divides all acts into three categories 
according to their moral significance. An act must be either: (1) indifferent, 
falling within the "robust zone of indifference"; (2) required, wherein fail-
ure to act warrants blame; or (3) supererogatory, being beyond the "cutoff 
for heroism." Fishkin assumes that any given act fits one and only one of 
these three categories. Having posited these three assumptions, Fishkin 
proceeds to test various theories of obligation against them. Most of these 
theories break down at a large scale because they require results inconsis-
tent with Fishkin's assumptions. The "minimal altruism" principle, for ex-
ample, directly conflicts with these assumptions, since it requires additional, 
repetitive relief contributions, even when one has given away a substantial 
portion of one's income. "Minimal altruism" requires acts more reasonably 
categorized as supererogatory. The conflict is plain; "minimal altruism," if 
carried to its logical extreme, is inconsistent with the "cutoff for heroism." 
The indictment of "minimal altruism" applies with even greater force to 
moral theories with a stronger concept of general obligation. Classical utili-
tarianism, for example, suggests that when the "perfectly sympathetic spec-
tator" views the world impartially, he must maximize the net utility or 
happiness of all persons. General obligations to others necessarily become 
"impossible to deny" (p. 159). Christianity's "Golden Rule" is another 
moral theory which cannot avoid conflict with Fishkin's moral assump-
tions. As Fishkin points out, if an actor must treat a starving refugee as the 
actor would wish to be treated in the same situation, the actor will assume 
general obligations much greater than the more modest principle of "mini-
mal altruism would impose" (p. 157). Under both classical utilitarianism 
and the Golden Rule, demanding general obligations require individual 
sacrifice far beyond the "cutoff for heroism" integral to Fishkin's "basic 
structure of individual morality." 
Fishkin also applies his thesis to the generalization argument, which 
analyzes the morality of an action by considering the consequences of its 
becoming the general pattern of conduct (p. 97). Thus, while a single apple 
picked from a roadside orchard arguably does no harm and hence falls 
within the zone of indifference, a general pattern of everyone picking from 
the orchard would cause significant harm and would thus fall within the 
zone of required inaction. Fishkin assails the generalization argument on 
two grounds. First, he argues that the generalization principle would shrink 
4. P. 17; see, e.g., D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 95-96 (1971); Unn-
son, Saints and Heroes, in MORAL CONCEPTS 60-73 (J. Feinberg e~. 1969). 
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the robust zone of indifference to insignificance. If acts are judged on the 
hypothetical results of everyone behaving the same way, many of our most 
mundane actions would be proscribed because they will have some evil re-
sult.5 Secondly, the discrepancy between the morality of the same action 
performed in isolation and on a large scale itself illustrates the author's 
thesis. If an action cal} be classified as both indifferent and proscribed, the 
unique classification assumption is violated and "non-equivalence" exists. 
Fishkin's argument may be most vulnerable at this point. David Lyons 
has advanced a theory that denies the nonequivalence of the generalization 
argument, yet attempts to preserve the unique classification assumption.6 
Lyons contends that the moral character of the apple-picking does not vary 
whether the act is viewed in isolation or is generalized over like acts. Al-
though the orchard is not significantly harmed until some threshold number 
of apples are picked, each person who picked an apple contributed equally 
to the depletion of the orchard. While an apple picked from a full orchard 
may seem morally insignificant, this illusion persists only so long as we ig-
nore the act's contribution to a serious harm. According to Lyons, the 
equal distribution of blame to each act places each squarely within the cate-
gory of required inaction, maintaining the integrity of the unique classifica-
tion assumption. 
Fishkin's response to Lyons' argument is unsatisfactory. Fishkin argues 
that nonequivalence still exists on a sufficiently large scale, even admitting 
Lyons' threshold concept. Where it takes a large number of acts to reach 
the threshold, one of those acts viewed in isolation will be allocated such a 
small fraction of the threshold effect as to make its effect trivial and place it 
within the zone of indifference. Thus, the nonequivalence: the threshold-
breaking act viewed alone is indifferent, while generalized over similar acts 
it is proscribed. Fishkin himself recognizes two problems with this re-
sponse: it assumes that the threshold-crossing acts are more numerous than 
perhaps Lyon would admit, and it further assumes a "cutoff for triviality" 
and "robust zone of indifference."7 
Fishkin's response to Lyons' argument demonstrates how utterly depen-
dent his thesis is upon his initial moral assumptions concerning the robust 
zone of indifference, the cutoff for heroism, and the uniqueness of classifica-
tions. Far from being a fault, however, this dependence is responsible for 
the impressive strength of his argument. The three assumptions possess 
strong intellectual and intuitive appeal. Admittedly, some of their attrac-
tiveness results from the necessarily unspecific way in which they are 
phrased. This, however, does not undermine Fishkin's equally imprecise 
5. Fishkin presents the example of serving beef at a dinner party. While seemingly inno-
cent, it is not totally so; the practice contributes in a small way both to the wasteful use of the 
world's food resources and to the guests' chances of heart disease. P. 95. 
6. See D. LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 62-188 (1965). 
7. Fishkin points out that a denial of a cutoff for triviality must also result in the collapse 
of the essential "robust zone of indifference" since "however trivial the consequences of an 
individual act, when it is generalized over a large enough number of other similar acts its 
consequences will routinely be enlarged to a level of moral significance." The collapse would 
entail "a pervasive moralization of everyday life." P. 104. This pervasive moralization would 
cause the loss of freedom to do as we please in broad areas of our lives. P. 22. 
March 1983] Limits of Obligation 921 
conclusion: that at some sufficiently large social scale, our basic ethical 
structure breaks down under the weight of general obligation. 
Fishkin's work offers little practical aid to attorneys. His work belongs 
to the realm of moral philosophy. Fishkin analyzes individual obligations 
that are essentially extra-legal. His arguments are sophisticated and tightly 
crafted. Many times the reader will think of potential objections only to 
find them addressed comprehensively in subsequent paragraphs. 
Refreshingly, Fishkin admits his inability to offer a solution to the prob-
lem he so clearly articulates. Rather, the book sets out the general problem 
and then proceeds to numerous applications and illustrations. Fishkill 
does, however, hint at possibilities. In particular he suggests that obliga-
tions that become problematic for individuals to assume on a large scale 
might better be left to "collectivities, nation-states, and other large institu-
tions" (p. 9). This tentative suggestion offers little promise for an escape 
from Fishkin's dilemma. While shifting responsibility for problems such as 
world hunger from individuals to collectivities may mitigate the problems 
articulated in Fishkin's thesis, it seems unlikely to solve the problems. Pre-
sumably, a "cutoff for heroism" exists for larger political units as well as for 
individuals, and the moral demands of the relatively disadvantaged in the 
world may tax even the largest political institutions' ability to respond with-
out "heroic" efforts. 
